> because the analytic philosophers liked to think of knowledge as justified true belief I used to teach this material every year back when I was a professor working on a mix of programming language and natural language semantics (I apply the former to syntactic theory in my first book). If you want to learn more and you like higher-order or modal logic, check out the sections of my semantics book on intensionality and higher-order modal logic. The site also has a search box, but it doesn’t work. For anyone who wants to search the blog, you can do site specific Google searches like the one I did to find my old post. But it’s all semantics in terms of how we define what the words “belief” and “knowledge” mean in a technical context. To trot out some more classical terminology, the axioms Paul Alper and I cite are what economists would call “normative” (what consistent reasoners should do) rather than “descriptive” (what people actually do). For example, one might believe in some kind of miracle cure without believing you believe in miracles. People can believe things in some sense but not believe they believe them. I do not think that the axiom Paul Alper cites, that if you believe x, you believe you believe x, is true of real people’s beliefs. This is problematic for a lot of reasons and you can make an entire career in philosophy exploring this boundary.
knowledge (epistemic) if not by invoking obscure latin nomenclature? To relate epistemic and doxastic logics, you typically have an axiom that says if you know something, then you also believe it, because the analytic philosophers liked to think of knowledge as justified true belief. How else would an academic talk about belief (doxastic) vs. Usually it’s just me and Keith O’Rourke talking to each other in philosophical terms, so not surprising that Andrew doesn’t remember this old comment. Of course it has been mentioned, perhaps not surprisingly, by me in a post about this very topic. This entry was posted in Miscellaneous Science, Zombies by Andrew. My response: I’ve never heard the term “doxastic” before, but this discussion reminds me of the distinction between evidence and truth, which I’ve discussed in many places (for example here and here) and which I think causes no end of troubles among scientists who conflate these two ideas. The preferred synonym was limited to perspired. * Transpired is an interesting word to me because, as incredible as it may seem, the synonym used today for it, i.e., happened, was fiercely opposed in the 1920s. In all your blogging items, has doxastic ever been mentioned by anyone? Then I discovered that I am very late to this party regarding doxastic logic. In recent months I have been mumbling that no one else seems to recognize that Bayesian Revision needs revision because on an empirical basis, humans unlike machines, ignore evidence that contradicts a prior belief-the House Committee is on tonight and I will be glued to what transpires* even though my priors indicate nothing will move the needle.
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